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The use of market-based instruments (MBIs) to provide and protect ecosystem 
services has gained significant attention in Australia.  Despite their popularity, MBIs 
are not appropriate for the provision of all ecosystem services.  Rather, MBIs must be 
carefully designed given the ecosystem service outcomes desired, while meeting the 
needs of participants.  In this paper we detail the importance of a robust theoretical 
structure to underpin the selection and design of an MBI.  In particular, we 
demonstrate the role of identifying and analysing the nature of the market failures 
present, and their implications for instrument design.  Our conclusions are illustrated 
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INTRODUCTION 
Market-based instruments remain a novel policy instrument in Australia.  Whilst many 
are considering MBI potential, with particular enthusiasm for competitive tenders, 
relatively few regional natural resource management (NRM) groups are 
experimenting with pilots or wider applications.  Few regional bodies have sufficient 
knowledge about why, where and how MBIs operate, their potential advantages and 
disadvantages, and how to integrate these instruments into policy toolkits.  Over the 
past five years The Markets for Ecosystem Services team at CSIRO has researched 
and developed a number of market based instruments (MBIs) intended for 
implementation at the regional scale.  This paper sets out some key lessons from 
that research for regions and beyond.  Our focus in this paper is on when and where 
to use which MBI, and on effective MBI design.   
MBIs are intended to achieve more efficient or effective environmental 
outcomes than comparable policy instruments.  They do this by harnessing the 
organisational strengths and the competitive pressures of markets.  Markets provide 
an effective conduit for information about the relative costs and benefits of alternative 
actions.  They generate incentives to achieve improved environmental outcomes 
through market signals rather than through explicit directives such as regulation.   
Markets encourage innovation and profit seeking behaviour.  Effective MBIs are 
designed to replicate these strengths.  To do so they must be designed to overcome 
the ‘market failures’ that have prevented an effective market from emerging for the 
desired environmental outcome. 
The efficiencies of markets are driven by the gains to participants from 
voluntary exchange – the ‘gains from trade’.  These gains emerge from differences or 
heterogeneities between market participants.  Gains from trade are driven by Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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mutually advantageous exchange in markets with buyers (sellers) discriminating 
between alternative sellers (buyers) on the basis of factors such as cost, location and 
certainty of provision.  MBIs can only be effective where such heterogeneity exists 
and there is a socially acceptable basis for effective market discrimination.   
Effective MBIs are thus an exercise in designing mechanisms that encompass 
and engage potential market participants and release the gain from trade.  MBI form 
is governed by whether reforms to existing markets are envisaged to be successful 
(market friction instruments) or new markets would need to be created (price or 
quantity instruments).  Prime consideration in choice of form is relative efficiency and 
community acceptability of alternative property right structures, with a variety of 
lesser considerations influencing form and implementation    
The focus of this paper is on the lessons for designing MBIs in a regional 
context.  Many of these lessons are not new.  The lessons are incomplete because 
there is still much to be learned about MBIs, and some aspects of design are 
technically difficult and require ongoing research.  The paper is structured as follows.  
In the next section we provide a brief context by defining and describing the MBI 
approach.  In the third section we discuss factors that should be considered in 
deciding why and where to apply an MBI and what form it should take.  In the fourth 
section we describe a market failure approach to identifying critical design 
parameters that must be addressed in order for MBIs to be successful.  Throughout 
the paper we illustrate our discussion of the key concepts with examples drawn from 
our experience.  We conclude the paper with a synopsis of guidance for MBI design 
and some suggestions for future research. S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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WHAT ARE MARKET BASED INSTRUMENTS? 
Efforts to influence privately managed environmental outcomes have focused on one 
or more of four broad modes: 
1.  Motivational and norm based instruments (including public rewards or shaming) 
2.  Facilitative and enabling instruments involving no direct financial transfers, 
rather they focus on overcoming information and institutional constraints to 
production 
3.  Financial instruments involving direct cash benefits or penalties; and 
4.  Regulatory instruments which require mandatory actions be taken or avoided. 
In essence, a wholly economic model views each mode as being engineered to 
achieve a broadly similar outcome: private benefits that outweigh private costs.   
Private net benefits may be generated by any or all of financial incentives; enhanced 
private benefits through personal enjoyment of ones own environmental outcomes; 
reduced guilt or enhanced warm glow; or threat of punitive response.   
MBIs typically involve some combination of facilitation/enabling financial or 
regulatory instruments.  The intention is to use MBIs as the vehicle to deliver signals 
about desirable environmental outcomes and provide incentives for innovation, profit, 
and arbitrage in much the same way that regular markets do.  Well designed MBIs in 
appropriate applications offer the potential to deliver outcomes at lower cost to 
government and with improved flexibility and lower compliance costs to landholders 
than alternative instruments.  These outcomes are achieved in four ways: 
1.  Allowing flexibility in the way participants choose to respond to the instrument so 
each individual can choose the lowest cost means of achieving the desired 
outcome Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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2.  Encouraging greater change amongst those who can achieve change most 
cheaply (and less amongst expensive providers), as opposed to imposing 
equivalent change requirements on all 
3.  Placing positive incentives on better NRM, as compared to the negative or 
punitive incentives evident in regulatory approaches; and 
4.  In combination these incentives drive innovation and continual improvements in 
NRM management that are the source of continuing efficiency gains through 
time.  
Types of Market Based Instruments 
Australian literature has tended to define MBIs within a typology describing three 
modes of intervention: price based; quantity based; and market friction (NMBIPP 
2004).  This typology is shown in Figure 1 along with a brief description of the 
instrument and Australian examples.  Some MBI types, such as tax based policies or 
regulatory caps, cannot be applied by regional NRM organisations.  Others may be 
difficult to apply at a regional level because of boundary issues or skill and capacity 
constraints.  Some aspects of these constraints will be further discussed in sections 3 
and 4.
2  
Price based MBIs either assign or impact directly on the price of the desired 
environmental outcome.  Individuals and firms then respond to the modified market 
signals and adopt the resource use or management practice that offers them the 
greatest benefit.  While these instruments cannot guarantee the extent of changes, 
they act to cap the costs incurred under the instrument. 
                                                 
2 For a more complete discussion of MBIs including examples interested readers should visit the 
National Market Based Instruments Pilots Program website: www.napswq.gov.au; or see Whitten, 
Stoneham and Carter (2004).   S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Quantity based or ‘tradeable rights’ instruments create a market in the rights to 
engage in either a damaging activity (greenhouse gas emission), or more often to 
access a scarce resource (water).  In some cases, rights to valued new 
environmental commodities are created (such as rights to carbon sequestration).   
Tradeable rights instruments tend to be used when it is important to get a defined 
environmental outcome.  Government or a designated authority must determine the 
total quantity of the good to be expressed in the rights, who can own the various 
rights, the initial allocation of rights, the conditions under which trade can take place, 
and how rights will be monitored and enforced (Murtough et al. 2002).   
Market friction mechanisms are a catch-all term for instruments designed to 
improve the efficiency of an existing market for the desired ecosystem service.   
Market friction instruments primarily work by reducing transaction costs and thus 
increasing the accessible gains from trade.  For example, improving water market 
efficiency through the introduction of brokers or simplified trading arrangements 
would constitute a market friction MBI.   
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
WHY, WHERE AND WHICH MBI? 
Successful early MBI applications have stimulated regional NRM group interest, 
particularly given their limited resources and the inadequate effectiveness of many 
existing instruments on private lands.  Three main questions arise: 
1.  What information is needed to support decisions about MBI suitability? 
2.  Why and where will MBIs work?   
3.  Which MBI is best? Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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In a theoretical sense the answers to these questions are simple MBIs should 
only be considered where there are gains from trade.  They will only work if designed 
to capture gains and the best type of MBI is that which most effectively leverages the 
available gains in a form acceptable to the community.  To answer these questions 
pragmatically for any particular issue is obviously more complex.  
Information for Policy Design 
Good instrument design is reliant on a sound understanding of the biophysical issue 
and policy context regardless of whether MBIs or other policy options are being 
considered.  This is generally well recognised but may be even more important for 
MBIs with their emphasis on creating dynamic and ongoing incentives for improved 
environmental management.   
For a market to work it must not matter from whom the desired outcomes are 
sourced.  That is, the desired outcomes must be substitutable, at least within 
constraints such as duty of care requirements or rules preventing hotspots and 
similar perverse outcomes.  Basic biophysical information must therefore indicate: 
•  Where the desired ecosystem services are produced (that is, the spatial 
boundary) 
•  Possible management interventions that could increase ecosystem service 
production; and 
•  The degree of substitutability of sites or actions in terms of ecosystem service 
production.   
Three examples of salt management demonstrate different aspects of the 
biophysical context that will need to be understood before moving into formal MBI 
consideration and design.   S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Example 1: Reducing instream salinity in the Wimmera River 
The policy objective was to reduce the instream salinity in the Wimmera River at 
Horsham, Victoria.  Instream salinity is generated by discharge from saline aquifers 
into upstream tributaries.  The critical biophysical information is the source of salt 
entering streams and the management changes that could reduce these discharges.  
Within these bounds all upstream sources of reduction of instream salinity can be 
regarded as substitutable.
   
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Example 2: Managing irrigation salinity in the Coleambally Irrigation Area 
The policy objective is to reduce the incidence of irrigation induced soil salinisation 
and waterlogging in the Coleambally Irrigation Area (CIA).
3  The aquifer underlying 
the CIA is partitioned into a number of functionally separate areas as shown in Figure 
2.  Undertaking actions in one zone would not impact on the desired outcome in 
other zones.  Therefore, actions in zone 1 are not substitutable at all with actions in 
zones 2 or 3, and actions in zone 2a are only partially substitutable with actions in 
zone 2b.   
Example 3: Protecting roads from salinity and waterlogging in the Blackwood Basin 
The policy objective is to reduce the impacts of salinity and waterlogging on roads.  
Damage is usually confined to local aquifer impacts where roads run across valley 
floors.  Impacts are generally dependent on the actions undertaken upstream of road 
crossing points.  The upstream catchments where change can cost-effectively be 
achieved are mostly small; usually limited to one or two landholders, all of whom 
                                                 
3 The largely self-contained aquifers and the small surface outflows from the CIA mean that external 
impacts are small compared to the impacts on agricultural production, local infrastructure and local 
environmental impacts. Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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would need to change management.  Actions in one catchment are not substitutable 
with actions in another with respect to individual damage sites.  However, if funds are 
scare, then benefits from treating any individual site are substitutable with the 
benefits from treating other sites.   
The potential for substituting management intervention is different in each 
case.  In the Wimmera, all upstream salt sources are substitutable.  In the CIA, 
substitution is possible within any one zone.  In the Blackwood Basin, locations are 
not substitutable for the protection of a particular site.   
The relevant biophysical information must be linked to social and institutional 
information about likely market impacts in order to assess potential intervention 
impacts and effectiveness.  Three further examples are provided below to illustrate 
the kinds of market information that are important in policy design.   
Example 4: Ecosystem services and rural residential development in Murrindindi 
Shire 
Goulburn Broken Catchment Management Authority (CMA) and Murrindindi Shire 
Council desire enhanced ecosystem services from the catchment.  Any reforms 
intended to increase ecosystem service protection or production take place within a 
congested institutional landscape.  Overlapping regulatory requirements are imposed 
at the local and multiple state level agencies, with provision for further oversight at 
the regional level (Coggan, Whitten and Langston 2005).  These requirements must 
be clearly understood in order to identify the potential for MBI development and 
implementation.   S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Example 5: Who drives the Australian native seed market? 
The difficulties experienced by many revegetation projects in sourcing seed have 
lead to suggestions that the market is dysfunctional and in need of reforms.  To local 
projects the most obvious market participants are local suppliers; but these are 
dominated by suppliers to mining revegetation projects.  Failing to consider the 
acceptability and response of mining companies and their suppliers is likely to render 
reform on a local scale ineffectual or inappropriate. 
Example 6: The potential implications of linked markets 
Salinity and waterlogging issues in the Coleambally Irrigation Area (CIA) are primarily 
driven by water management.  Failing to consider the impacts of water prices on CIA 
water use decisions, and therefore for waterlogging and salinity in the region, could 
render intervention irrelevant. The potential impact in the CIA was assessed by 
modelling the threshold water price at which, in an unrestricted market, sufficient 
water would be sold from the region to eliminate the problem. 
Each example shows where inadequate understanding of the market context 
could lead to poor policy outcomes.  In each case there are important players present 
that can impact on policy effectiveness.  In Murrindindi Shire the cluttered regulatory 
context will limit and shape interventions.  Major, but largely unseen market 
participants in Australian native seed markets will need to support any proposed 
change for it to succeed.  In the CIA external market influences that raise water 
market prices could render a policy intervention redundant. Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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Why and Where to Consider MBIs? 
MBIs offer enhanced efficiency and effectiveness over alternative instruments when 
well designed and applied in the right context.  Specifically, MBIs are likely to 
outperform other instruments where: 
1.  There are large variations in the ability of potential participants to provide the 
desired outcome 
2.  There is flexibility in the range of responses that will deliver the desired outcome  
3.  Regulatory or other approaches are difficult to design, implement and 
administer; and 
4.  There is greater scope for innovation in improving NRM management. 
The ‘gains from trade’ that drive markets are primarily derived from differences, 
or heterogeneities, amongst the participants’ preferences, resources or production 
opportunities.  These differences must be harnessed through a market mechanism 
that provides continuing incentives to reduce costs and produce better products.  It 
follows that the level of heterogeneity, and the possible gains from trade, should be 
considered to decide if an MBI approach is warranted over alternative policy 
approaches.  Shelton, Langston and Whitten (2004) developed a rapid assessment 
tool for thinking about the nature of heterogeneity in NRM environments that is 
illustrated in Figure 3.  Biophysical differences can often be assessed through 
available mapping of relevant surrogates to the desired outcome or ecosystem 
service.  Management flexibility can be assessed through careful consideration of the 
range of management options available (and attractiveness to landholders) and the 
degree of cost variation in their application between landholders and across the S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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landscape.  Landholder heterogeneity can be assessed by considering the variation 
in social and economic characteristics within the target community.   
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Quantitative estimates of the scale of the available gains from trade should 
also be made where possible.  As an example consider the estimation of the likely 
gains from trade from changing management under alternative policy scenarios in 
the CIA (Robinson et al. 2005).  Five policy options were compared, four of which 
could achieve the desired reduction in recharge and the fifth was ‘business as usual’ 
(Table 1).   
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Policy options were compared within a calibrated model designed to capture 
variation in the landscape and available management actions of farms in the CIA.
4  
Modelled gains from trade amounted to a net present value (NPV) of $3.4m or just 
1.4% of the NPV of total income over the next 20 years when compared to ‘business 
as usual’.  Realised gains from trade are likely to be lower again as indicated by the 
experimental economics results from simulation and laboratory trials (Ward 2005).  
The conclusions illustrate the importance of carefully considering heterogeneity: 
gains from trade were small and unlikely to drive a recharge credit market.  However, 
all other policies performed worse than ‘business as usual’ illustrating the importance 
of designing policy to harness the gains from trade. 
                                                 
4 Modelling was undertaken using SWAGMAN Farm
® (Robinson et.al. 2005, Madden and Prathapar 
1999).  The goal was to identify whether the agricultural production impacts were sufficient to drive a 
recharge credit market, therefore non-production benefits of recharge mitigation were not included. Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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Deciding Which Form of MBI is Best 
Price, Quantity, or Market Friction? 
Market friction instruments target poor market design or opportunities to reduce 
transaction costs within existing markets.  In some cases existing government 
interventions may cause perverse market outcomes and these should always be 
assessed before more complex interventions are considered.  The market failure 
assessment process described in the next section provides a suitable framework for 
identifying opportunities to design and implement market friction instruments.   
In the absence of existing markets regional bodies face a choice between 
price and quantity based MBIs.  Weitzman (1974) notes that price and quantity based 
instruments will result in identical outcomes in circumstances of perfect information 
and competition.  In practice there are a number of complications in design and 
application that may lead to one being preferred over the other.  Reasons for 
preferring price or quantity based instruments are summarised in Figure 4.   
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Marginal costs and benefits of additional ecosystem services are rarely known 
with certainty.  Weitzman (1974) identifies several cases where price or quantity 
based instruments may be preferred based on uncertain costs and benefits.  If the 
marginal costs curve is steep relative to the marginal benefit curve at the optimal 
production level then price instruments will tend to be preferred because of the high 
cost risk of incorrect quantity targets.  Similarly, if marginal benefits are steep relative 
to marginal costs then quantity instruments will be preferred.  For similar reasons 
Weitzman notes that price instruments are preferred where there is a threshold 
(corner) in the marginal cost function (perhaps because a new technology is S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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reached) and vice-versa.  Weitzman also considers the impact of additional suppliers 
and concludes that the more potential suppliers the greater the case for a price-
based instrument.  Weitzman’s conclusion can be extended to argue that the more 
potential buyers the greater the case for a quantity based instrument. 
There are also several important non-economic reasons to favour either a price 
or quantity based instrument.  These include:  
•  Property right expectations: the polluter pays principle equates to a quantity 
based approach where targets are set and polluters must meet targets at their 
own cost.  The contrary beneficiary pays framework equates to a price-based 
mechanism.  Clear property right expectations may favour one or other 
approach 
• Jurisdictional  powers: legislation is usually needed to create or modify property 
rights that underpin quantity based instruments.  In contrast, price-based 
instruments can be implemented using contractual arrangements between the 
parties 
•  Time to produce desired outcomes: quantity based instruments may be 
preferred for protecting long term outcomes while price based approaches may 
only be effective so long as budgets remain available.  Other design parameters 
such as purchasing quantities (via covenants on property rights for example) or 
restrictions on trades to ensure long term production may also be relevant 
•  Transaction costs of mechanism: transaction costs tend to increase the larger 
the number of participants within the instrument, the more complex the 
engagement with the instrument, and the greater the ex-poste monitoring 
required amongst many other factors; and  Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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•  Degree of change required: expectations may change depending on the degree 
of cost imposed.  Mixed instruments may be favoured in such settings.   
Multiple or Single Service MBIs? 
The critical factor in deciding when to consider multiple-issue versus a single-issue 
market is the degree to which individual sites provide multiple ecosystem services 
combined with the potential for a single management action to generate multiple 
outcomes.  When each site provides multiple services and each management action 
contributes towards multiple targets, a single integrated MBI may be more cost-
effective than multiple instruments.  However, this is only the case, if the increased 
complexity, and establishment and ongoing transaction costs of including multiple 
issues within a single MBI are offset by an increase in the magnitude or efficiency of 
the outcomes achieved.  The single versus multiple service MBI dilemma is 
summarised in Figure 5.  Multiple-issue MBIs are likely to be most appropriate when 
there are numerous options available to change management on potential sites, but 
only some deliver multiple outcomes.
5  For example, farm forestry may deliver 
salinity benefits but not necessarily biodiversity outcomes, whereas mixed plantings 
may deliver both.     
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Single versus multiple issue framework tests in the Muttama and Jugiong sub-
catchments of the Murrumbidgee River indicated that few parts of the catchment 
were likely to deliver multiple ecosystem services.  Furthermore, few of the available 
management actions were able to deliver multiple outcomes.  In this case the 
benefits of a specialised MBI for each targeted ecosystem service would likely to 
                                                 
5 Note that if management changes and sites produce a similar mix of outcomes, just in different total 
quantities, a single outcome MBI is equivalent to a multiple outcome MBI. S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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outweigh any cost savings in combining these into a single instrument.  This 
conclusion may not be the case elsewhere (see for example the Victorian EcoTender 
trials – Eigenraam et al.. 2005) and so simple tests should always be undertaken to 
identify the likely mix of benefits from target sites.   
A Framework for Thinking about Market Based Instruments  
The information gathered by considering the issues discussed in this section can be 
used to systematically think about the benefits of an MBI approach compared to 
alternative options (if any) as shown in Figure 6.  Additional information (such as 
specific design requirements) may cause earlier decisions to be reviewed or different 
conclusions to be drawn, so this would in practice be an iterative process not the 
linear one shown.  After gathering and considering this information a decision can be 
made about whether an MBI approach is likely to succeed and if so, what kind of MBI 
is appropriate.   
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
To a large extent, technical design decisions about MBIs at the regional level 
are reliant on whether effective property rights or entitlements can be created for the 
ecosystem service.  An alternative decision tree focusing on the role of property 
rights in MBI design is presented in Figure 7.  The key attributes of property rights 
that would need to be in place for various MBI forms to succeed are discussed in the 
next section along with other MBI design issues.  The final form of MBI is designed 
via a process of identifying and overcoming market failures rather than via selection 
from a menu.  Hence, the focus is on process-based guidelines for MBI design and 
implementation rather than a menu-based discussion of how to deliver each MBI 
form. Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
A MARKET FAILURE APPROACH TO DESIGNING EFFECTIVE MBIs 
Market Failure Analysis as a Tool for MBI Design 
MBIs are used where markets have failed to emerge or fail to operate effectively.  
Effective MBIs require impediments to markets to be overcome.  Our experience has 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of using a systematic analysis of the market 
failures.  MBI design is then framed with solutions to these impediments in mind.  Our 
focus is on market failures but the potential for government failure and policy failure 
to impact on instrument design should also be considered.   
A summary of potential market failures is presented in Table 2.  A number of 
other design issues that are not strictly market failures but which may be important to 
market success and should be considered in mechanism design are listed in Table 3.  
Additional issues specific to instruments or applications may be identified.   
Incomplete property rights combined with information asymmetries were found to 
exist in all cases which we studied.
6  Other market failures and design issues were 
less common, though constraints to participation, market structure, potential for 
interaction with other instruments, and linking outcomes to incentives should always 
be considered.  
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
An Example in Wimmera Catchment, Victoria 
An example of a market failure analysis is shown in Table 4.  The most important 
design issues for an MBI intended reduce salt loads to upper Wimmera Catchment 
                                                 
6 See Stoneham et al. (2003) for a good theoretical discussion of asymmetric information with respect 
to the design of the BushTender program and Murtough et.al. (2002) for a discussion of property right 
attributes. S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Streams are set out.  Additional design issues identified were: interactions with 
existing policy; changes to stakeholder expectations; permanent versus temporary 
change to service delivery; and treatment of joint or multiple bids within auctions.  
The additional design issues are often specific to the instrument.  For example, 
multiple bids are only an issue in a competitive tender or similar situation.  Often 
uncertainty remains about the significance of market failure.  For example, lack of 
landholder knowledge about techniques to revegetate the landscape and potential 
participation concerns were less important than initially assessed in the Wimmera 
example (as identified in a design workshop – see Whitten and Shelton 2005).   
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Designing Effective MBIs   
The specific needs and context of each MBI will differ based on the market failures 
present and the biophysical and market context.  Our conclusions therefore take the 
form of examples and general guidance that can be applied in a variety of settings.  
Costly expert input is often needed at this point to facilitate good design: but failures 
can be costly, both financially and in lost goodwill.   
Metric Design  
Clear rights or entitlements are needed to commodify services and underpin 
exchange.  A measure or metric is usually needed to define the new commodity.  
Metric design principles are critically important to overcoming incomplete property 
rights.  The role of the metric in an MBI is often confused because of the multiple 
roles that measurements of ecosystem services and actions play in the NRM sphere.  
A sample of these roles is presented in Figure 8.  MBI metrics are specialised tools 
that are used to quantifying what is to be paid for in a way that can be directly Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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compared across individuals.  Only rarely will the same measure be suitable for 
multiple purposes within the policy design framework.     
The creation of a suitable metric remains an impediment to the implementation 
of most MBI instruments.   Metrics represent a complex bundle of trade-offs and are 
not simply a question of estimating a measure of biophysical change (which in itself 
is extremely complex) but often must also take into account other drivers of values.  
For example, the location of change may be important.  The core of metric design is 
the conversion of spatially distributed and differing degrees of outcome change into a 
single, cardinal, comparable unit.  That is, the metric must indicate how much better 
one proposal is than another.   
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Nine principles that should be considered in designing a suitable metric are 
shown in Table 5.  The core physical measure of ecosystem service production is 
often adjusted by subtracting what would happen anyway (creating a measure of 
marginal change), or via subtraction of a duty or care or minimum standard level of 
provision.  Location, timing and risk are generally incorporated by weighting the basic 
measure.  Irreversibility and spillovers are often included as filters.
7  Note also that 
some metric design issues may be incorporated elsewhere in instrument design.  For 
example, limiting eligibility to specific sites or sub-regions reduces the need for a 
separate location component.  Multiple output MBIs will also require metrics for each 
service targeted to be normalised and weighted in order to combine them into an 
aggregated measure.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
7 Weights modify the quantity/quality value estimated for the target ecosystem service while filters are 
used to screen out undesired options from further consideration.   S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Table 5 includes an example drawn from summary recommendations for a 
metric developed by Wimmera CMA to support an auction to reduce salt loads in 
Wimmera River (Whitten and Shelton 2005).  Some principles will be less important 
for some applications and may not be included.  In this example location and time are 
not regarded as important in their own right, and no irreversibility or spillover impacts 
of sufficient importance were identified. Metric construction may also avoid formal 
separation of components.  Despite the apparent simplicity of the approach, the 
complexity of estimating a broad quantity / quality measure should not be 
underestimated.  For example, the biophysical model underpinning the metric is 
based on years of biophysical and modelling research and takes several hours of 
computer processing time to optimise. 
Overcoming Market Failures and Other Design Issues 
Market failure analysis will likely reveal a number of market failures that MBI design 
will need to address.  In many cases supporting instruments such as extension 
support (a facilitative instrument) or regulations are necessary.  Indeed information 
and extension programs are a feature of most competitive tender (auction) 
approaches implemented to date.  It is critical to note that the outcome of market 
failure analyses will be specific to the problem studied, and often to the local context 
as well.  Therefore, caution should be exercised in transferring mechanisms to new 
locations or issues. 
An example of a completed market failure analysis with a menu of potential 
design solutions identified is shown in Table 6 for the investigation of a cap and trade 
approach to managing recharge to groundwater aquifers in the CIA.  The examples 
show a number of different but overlapping design parameters that needed to be 
considered in the form of market investigated for implementation including: right or Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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entitlement allocation and ownership; interaction between the metric and market; and 
penalty arrangements. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
There are usually a number of other market design issues not directly related 
to identified market failures, but rather related to the attributes of the particular form 
of MBI chosen and the context in which it is applied.  An example of the design 
issues specific to a particular context and mechanism is afforded by the auction for 
reducing in-stream salinity from steep hills in the Upper Wimmera Catchment (Table 
7).  Most of these relate to the design and implementation of a competitive tender 
mechanism.  Others are generic, such as managing impacts on other incentive 
programs, community acceptance of the mechanism, and to some extent managing 
changes to stakeholder expectations. 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Other Aspects of MBI Design and Implementation 
Successful MBIs usually incorporate supporting policy instruments to function 
effectively.  Quantity based instruments tend to require regulatory underpinnings to 
create effective property rights or entitlements.  Auction success is dependent on 
effective extension support for bid development.  Combinations of MBIs are also 
possible – for example use of auctions to create offset banks has been proposed in a 
number of settings.  Little formal analysis has been undertaken on strategies and 
pitfalls in mixing instruments.  Economic theory suggests a trade-off between the 
additional costs involved in combining additional instruments and the additional 
ecosystem services produced.  In some cases it is clearly necessary and desirable to 
combine additional instruments.  In other areas careful assessment is advisable.  S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Mechanism design should also consider the potential to nest design needs 
amongst existing programs and initiatives in order to reduce cost and increase 
effectiveness.  The main rationale for instrument nesting is the potential to 
significantly reduce participant and administrative transaction costs.  In practice, 
nesting involves a trade-off between incorporating aspects of less than perfect 
existing instruments with the cost of designing and implementing new ones.  For 
example, the apparent feasibility of the cap and trade approach in the CIA rested on 
nesting it into the pre-existing regulatory platform provided by water supply contracts, 
including environmental provisions and monitoring arrangements, administered by 
Coleambally Irrigation Cooperative Limited (CICL).  Similarly, consideration of 
development offsets in Murrindindi Shire required careful consideration of 
opportunities and constraints imposed by an already cluttered legislative and 
regulatory planning environment.  Particular emphasis was given to sharing 
processes in order to minimise transaction costs imposed by duplication and facilitate 
a consistent approval process. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our goal in this paper has been to set out the key lessons for regions and beyond 
from five years of research by the Markets for Ecosystem Services team at CSIRO.  
Our research has yielded practical advice on how to identify where MBIs will perform 
well, insights into MBI design needs and issues to consider for implementation.  It is 
now well known that some MBI forms are impractical at regional level, including most 
quantity based instruments and those price based instruments that use the taxation 
system.  Our results give confidence that widespread application of MBIs that are 
practical at the regional level will yield substantial economic and environmental Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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benefits.  They also reinforce that MBIs must be well designed in order to deliver on 
the early promise they are showing.   
Many of our findings emphasise the importance of known factors such as 
good information about biophysical and institutional context.  Our conclusions are 
not, and could not be a recipe book.  While robust templates for successful 
implementation of specific MBI forms have begun to emerge, effectiveness is 
strongly influenced by regional and local contexts.  Therefore, it will usually be 
necessary for regions considering MBIs to seek specialist advice.  The level of advice 
needed will of course differ depending on the complexity of the issue being 
addressed and the nature of the MBI under consideration. 
MBI benefits result from harnessing the ‘gains from trade’.  Gains are derived 
from differences, or heterogeneities, amongst landholder preferences, resources or 
production opportunities.  Future gains are captured by creating positive incentives to 
improve management rather than to avoid regulation, and encourage innovation.   
Where these gains cannot be harnessed an MBI will perform no better, and may 
perform worse than other measures.  Good information underpins assessment of 
potential gains from trade.  It identifies the degree to which actions on different sites 
can be substituted in order to achieve the desired outcome and therefore the 
selection of spatial boundaries.   
A decision between MBI forms is initially based on whether existing markets 
are present and can be modified, which would necessitate a market friction 
instrument.  Decisions between price and quantity based MBIs are based on 
economic and non-economic factors.  Economic factors are relative marginal costs 
and benefits, thresholds in cost or benefit functions, and number of market 
participants (Weitzman 1974).  Non-economic factors include property right S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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preferences (duty of care, polluter pays or beneficiary pays), time lags in production, 
jurisdictional powers, and transaction costs of the instrument. 
MBIs are intended to overcome market failures to release gains from trade.  
Market failures present should be systematically identified as a basic input into the 
MBI design process.  Incomplete property rights and information failure or asymmetry 
are likely to be present in all cases.  Core property right and information asymmetry 
issues tend to be compounded by other market failures and design issues.    
Explicit design advice is complicated by the specific needs and context of 
each MBI.  Property right issues are an important issue in the design of any MBI and 
will be complicated by measurement issues.  The role of the measurement metric in 
an MBI is often confused because of the multiple roles that measurements of 
environmental assets, ecosystem services, and management actions play in the 
NRM sphere.  The MBI metric is the basis for measuring relative and absolute 
outcomes, and consequently who benefits and who pays.  Nine principles were 
identified that should be considered in metric design.   
MBI design must incorporate the necessary supporting mechanisms needed 
to ensure success, such as regulatory change or communication and engagement 
programs.  Opportunities to nest MBIs in order to reduce transaction costs should 
also be identified.  We have illustrated these design issues using examples but 
recognise the difficulty in practical application faced by many regional NRM groups 
with limited access to specialist skills in the area. 
Our findings reinforce the message that MBIs show considerable promise in 
delivering improved environmental outcomes.  Achieving success requires attention 
to aligning instruments and policy options; concurrent or prior removal of perverse Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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incentives; and a focus on design detail.  Our findings are steps towards more 
effective policy at the regional level.  Yet many aspects of MBI design, development, 
implementation, adoption and effectiveness are still not well understood and 
promising opportunities remain.  Three areas identified were:  
•  Instruments for specific biophysical or landscape outcomes such as corridors, 
core habitat areas and mosaics or for environments with biophysical thresholds 
and discontinuities 
•  Specific design criteria such as how much and how certain does market 
information need to be; and 
•  How to mix MBIs with other instruments, particularly with a focus on evolution to 
more efficient instruments in the future. 
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Source: Khan and Rana (2005) 
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Figure 4.  Summary of Rational for Preferring Price or Quantity Based Instruments  
Price based  Quantity based 
-  Fixed budget  
-  High cost of additional services 
-  Small benefits from extra services 
-  Community should pay for services
-  Cost-sharing to achieve targets 
-  NRM outcomes quick to change 
- Physical  targets 
-  Large benefits of extra services 
-  Low costs of extra services 
-  Presence of thresholds with high NRM 
damage 
-  Community has right to desired 
outcome  
-  Long time to change NRM outcomes 
-  Protection of existing outcomes  
 S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Figure 5.  One MBI or Many? 
Management options generate multiple outcomes   
Yes No 
Yes  1. Multiple outcome MBI  
2. Multiple outcome MBI 
possible – encourage 
innovation so that 
management actions 
deliver multiple outcomes 






3. Consider increasing 
geographic area to attain 
sufficient sites with 
multiple ES potential. 
4. Multiple outcome MBI 
unlikely to succeed – 
consider separate MBIs.  
 
Source: Adapted from Shelton, Langston and Whitten (2004) Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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Figure 7.  Decision Tree identifying Common MBI Forms  
Single or multiple issue MBI? 











Can effective and 
complete property 
rights be created? 








Determined, in part, 
by jurisdictional level 
MBI considered a. 
Create property rights.  
E.g. communication 
spectrum 
Design and implement 
cap and trade markets 
e.g. water, carbon, fish 
quotas.  Offsets, 
bubble licenses and 
similar measures 
MBI unlikely – 




Cost of MBI likely to 
outweigh benefits – 
explore other options 
Cost Effective Exclusion  Mechanism Design 
Are further regulations 
such as a cap on usage 
required? 
Measures such as 
auctions that use 




Do other considerations 
lead to a preference for 
price or quantity? 
?
Is a market friction 
instrument likely to 
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Figure 8.  Natural Resource Measures and Metrics in MBIs 
 
 
Notes: See Whitten et al. (2006) for more discussion on the role of the metric in MBIs 
Information for target setting 
Vegetation status 
Threatened species status 
Policy targets 
Measuring impacts in MBIs  
(MBI metric design) 
Monitoring of actions within MBI 
framework 
Evaluation of MBI 
Selection & design of MBI  
Evaluation of outcomes against 
targets 
Example measure(s) 
Water quality targets 
Vegetation area targets 
Step in policy design 
Share of resource (water) 
Habitat hectares (biodiversity) 
Quantity of water used 
Habitat structure benchmarks 
Vegetation condition index 
Cost and outcomes versus 
alternatives  S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Table 1.  Potential Recharge Management Policies in CIA 
Scenario  Economic theory / policy  Impact on agricultural 
production 
1.  Business as usual  Open access  
(current rice area quota 
continues) 
Yield declines via an 
assumed linear damage 
path 
2.  Rice cap  Input cap on most damaging 
process – rice production 
No further yield decline 
3.  Water cap  Input cap on most damaging 
input  
– irrigation water 
No further yield decline 
4.  Cap and no trade  Cap on net recharge at the farm 
scale but no trading allowed 
No further yield decline 
5. Cap-and-trade  Cap  on  net recharge with trade 
allowed 
No further yield decline 
 Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
 
36 
Table 2.  Summary of Possible Market Failures and Issues 
Market 
failure 
Issues  Considerations 
1. Definable  Create and define property rights.  
2. Measurable  Develop metric to describe relevant 
attributes.  
3. Excludable  If free-riders cannot be excluded, empower 




4. Transferable  Create right that can be transferred 
separately from other rights (such as 
separation from land title). 
1. Ecosystem service 
production function 
unknown 
Develop metric to link land management 
actions with ecosystem service production.
2. Benefits of 
management actions 
unknown to buyer 
Metric applied by buyer/public agency to 
calculate public benefits of management 
actions by landholders.  
Non-market valuation to capture public 
non-use values. 
3. Benefits of 
management actions 
unknown to producer 
Apply metric and extension programs to 
inform landholders how to produce 
ecosystem service, and of the associated 
private benefits. 
4. Scientific uncertainty  Incorporate ‘risk premium’ into metric. 





5. No common market 
place  
Create marketplace. 
1. Thin markets  Expand scope of market to bring in more 
traders. 
Work to maximise participation rates. 
Market 
structure 
2. Market power  Expand market scope to bring in more 
competitors. 












Fostering trust in contracting. 
1. Capital  Upfront payments. 
2. Transaction costs  Public agency to provide information and 
advice. 





3. Inexperience with 
mechanism 
Provide training on market mechanism. 
 Putting Theory into Practice: Market Failure and Market Based Instruments 
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Table 3.  Some other Market Design Issues of Importance 
Design issue  Description 
1. Multiple ecosystem 
service outcomes 
Consider multiple outcome market 
Facilitate access to other markets (e.g. carbon) 
2. Interaction with other 
incentive programs. 
May be perverse incentive for strategic playing off of one 
program against another and/or double dipping. 
3. Interaction with other 
non-incentive programs 
Existing rules and regulations will need to be considered 
in the design of any new instrument. 
4. Changes to 
stakeholder 
expectations 
Stakeholders stop providing a free service for the public 
good and expect instead a relatively high payment 
through a market. This behavioural change may be 
effectively irreversible. 
5. Risk if no change  If target not achieved will any irreversible loss to 
ecosystem services occur?  
6. Spillovers to other 
ecosystem services 
Unconsidered impacts on other ecosystem services e.g. 
revegetation for biodiversity may reduce stream flow. 
7. Permanent versus 
temporary change 
Likelihood of management changes being reversed 
versus cost to permanently protect. 
8. Multiple actions in a 
single market place 
Can or should participants engage in the instrument in 
multiple ways?  For example, multiple bids in a tender. 
9. Treatment of coalitions 
of participants 
Should joint activities be allowed or encouraged?  For 
example, joint bids within auctions (see market power in 
Table 2). 
 S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Table 4.  Summary of Wimmera Market Failure Analysis 
Market failure  Implications in the Wimmera context 
Property rights – the need 
for clear definition, 
allocation and 
measurement 
Rights to redistribute salt in landscapes are unclear.  Duty of 
care requirements are only indirectly related to salt and water 
balances and there is a lack of effective rights relating to land 
management and salinity control.  Consistent measures of the 
salinity impacts of alternative land management actions did not 
exist (but were developed from existing information). 
Property rights – desired 
ecosystem services are 
non-excludable  
Landholders reducing salt export have no way of identifying who 
will benefit and ensuring beneficiaries pay for these services.  
Government could act on behalf of potential buyers to remove 
this problem. 
Asymmetric information – 
about landholders’ costs of 
changing management 
There is no market price for reduced salt loads that could be 
used to purchase changes to land management.  Therefore, the 
CMA does not know what price or which landholders to pay to 
change land management. 
Asymmetric information – 
salt benefit from changing 
management 
Governments know, or can estimate, the likely reduction in salt 
movement from changing land management but landholders do 
not.  Landholders need information about what changes to make 
where in the landscape. 
Information failure – tools 
and techniques 
The tools and techniques required to establish and maintain 
land uses that reduce salt movement may be unfamiliar to 
landholders.  Government has collected best practice 
information that could be used in this context. 
Information failure - 
scientific uncertainty 
Uncertainty remains about the absolute and relative outcomes 
for salt movement from alternative land management actions. 
Difficulty measuring and 
monitoring success 
Successful implementation of the management actions can only 
be measured well after they have taken place but costs are 
incurred up-front.  Therefore, it is difficult to design payment 
structures that give appropriate incentives for best practice 
implementation without intensive monitoring. 
Market power  Too few landholders may be interested in participating to allow 
competitive outcomes under an MBI solution. 
Market entry constraints  Up front costs of changing land management are high and will 
need to be considered in any payment mechanism. 
 
Source: Adapted from Whitten and Shelton 2005 
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Table 5.  Principles of Metric Design 
Design principle  Description  Wimmera salinity reduction 
auction recommendations 
1. Quantity/Quality -  A metric is a physical quantity or 
cardinal index of a biophysical 
outcome.   
-  There are usually a number of 
measures that deliver different 
messages to landholders and 
represent different outcomes.     
-  Direct measurement of outcomes 
is preferred but usually estimated 
using a proxy based on changes 
to inputs.     
Estimate salt impact of alternative 
management changes in tonnes 
of salt at Horsham.  Management 
impacts are incorporated using 
input-based proxy measures for 




1.  Do any packages of 
management change generate 
synergistic outcomes?  For 
example, corridors over scattered 
vegetation, revegetation in the 
neighbourhood of existing large 
remnants compared to more 
scattered activities? and 
2.  Are there any biophysical 
thresholds that are likely to be 
created crossed or impacted in 
different pathways?  
While spatial relationships do 
exist they are likely to be 
relatively small and very difficult 
to incorporate.  Recommended 
they be ignored in the initial 
application. 
3. Change  relative 
to a baseline 
Important if the goal of policy is to 
improve outcomes from a baseline, 
rather than some absolute maximum 
ongoing quantity.  The baseline is 
usually defined as the higher of a 
specified duty of care and the actual 
outcome where management 
change is unlikely.   
Change should be measured 
relative to a uniform benchmark 
for the salt export impacts of 
business as usual (annual 
pasture).  This creates an implied 
minimum duty of care.  
Bids in areas with scattered trees 
may complicate this baseline. 
4. Location  – 
relative values 
1.  Locations closer to the 
community might be valued more 
highly; 
2.  The production of the ecosystem 
service is intrinsically greater in 
some places; or 
3.  The change may generate 
differential service outcomes 
depending on impact pathways 
(such as for water quality).  
Estimate impact of proposals at a 
single downstream point 
(Horsham).  The path or stream 
contributing to that point was not 
identified as being important, only 
the aggregate impact at the 
downstream point. S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Design principle  Description  Wimmera salinity reduction 
auction recommendations 
5. Timing  All things equal, earlier outcomes are 
preferred over later ones.   
A steady state estimate is 
favoured due to the relatively 
short time horizons predicted for 
outcomes on steep hill country 
and the uncertainty about actual 
time needed to achieve 
outcomes. 




Some management changes may be 
more likely to succeed than others.  
The key factor in success may be 
the initial establishment or the on-
going management.  Likelihood of 
success can either be considered 
within the metric design or the 
payment mechanism.   
Consider weighting by estimated 
probability of successful 
implementation (aspect may be 
important for revegetation). 
7.  Risk / certainty 
of outcome 
success 
Even with successful establishment 
of the management change there 
may be uncertainty about the 
eventual impacts on outcomes.  For 
example, this may be the case with 
management changes for which less 
is known about their impact on 
recharge.   
Eligible actions and sites 
restricted but if expanded 
consider weighting by estimated 
probability of outcome being 
achieved. 
8.  Irreversibility  Irreversibility is related to risk.  
Where thresholds are anticipated, 
such as extinction of species, there 
is a case for favouring less risky 
actions that achieve change sooner.  
No irreversibility issues identified.
9. Spillover 
impacts 
Spillover impacts are adverse 
consequences caused by 
management change that could lead 
to a perverse outcome either locally 
or elsewhere in the system (such as 
increased fire risk from large scale 
revegetation).   
Tree planting will reduce base-
flows in streams and rivers in the 
catchment but is not likely to 
increase downstream salt 
concentration or significantly 
impact on water availability. 
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Table 6.  CIA Cap and Trade Market Failures Identified with Potential Solutions 
Market failure  Definition  Potential solutions 
Property rights 
– definition and 
assignment 
Rights to shared aquifers are not 
defined leading to farm management 
decisions being confounded by 
common property resource and free 
riding behaviour. 
•  Allocate rights to farmers. 
•  Social contracts formalising non-
market agreements.  
•  Assign rights to beneficiaries. 
Property rights - 
entitlement 
distribution 
Irrigators hold de facto rights at 
present.  Auction of rights is 
theoretically most efficient mechanism 
but procedural fairness makes de 
facto more likely. 
•  Assign property rights and 
associated obligations to 
farmers. 
•  Distribution of entitlements 
determined by community. 
Property rights 
and implied risk 
assignment 
Two risks could be faced by irrigators: 
a)  stochastic events such as rainfall 
variability; and 
b)  free riding by other farmers 
•  Normalised performance 
reduces stochastic risk. 
•  Effective rights and monitoring 
remove free riding risk. 
Information 
constraint 
Information constraints may limit 
engagement and adoption of recharge 
management options. 
•  Communications strategy to 
facilitate engagement. 
•  Use trials to improve information.
Scientific 
uncertainty 
Accuracy of modelling, including rates 
of recharge and management 
impacts. 
•  Periodic review of models with 
care not to undermine security of 
rights. 
Market power - 
thin markets 
Few buyers and sellers imply difficulty 
trading.  Can lead to market power 
and hoarding behaviour. 
•  Numbers may be sufficient - test.
•  Centralised trading point. 




Performance based approach (using 
non-compliance penalty) provides 
stronger ongoing incentives for 
recharge management than input 
incentives.   
•  Tiered monitoring depending on 
level of threat.   
•  Create effective individual 
penalties that reflect damage. 
Market entry - 
capital 
constraint 
Capital constraints may limit adoption 
of recharge-reducing management 
options. 
•  Consider providing alternate 





Stochastic rainfall events can lead to 
systemic under or overachievement of 
recharge targets: farmers incur excess 
credits or debits, regardless 
management. 
•  Normalise performance leading 
to constant recharge credit 
allocations.  
•  Allow time-limited credit banking 
and borrowing. 
 
Source: Adapted from Whitten et al. (2005) S.M. Whitten, A. Coggan, A. Reeson and R. Gorddard 
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Bidding procedure  Sealed bid, discriminatory price competitive tender 
suggested. 
Managing risk of 
overpayment 
Set a confidential, pre-auction reserve to reduce 
CMA risk 
Community acceptance   Effective communication (plan and implement 
strategy). 
Interaction with other 
incentives 
Remove overlaps as far as possible. 
Changes to stakeholder 
expectations impact on 
future success of 
existing mechanisms 
Communicate the tender as a flexible new way of 
achieving land management change rather than 
explicitly as payments for ecosystem services.  
Treatment of services 
for which other markets 
may exist. 
Only contract for defined actions and outcomes, all 




Set a participation target taking into account: 
budget; anticipated costs of changing management 
and bid size; eligible landholders within region; 
participation in prior schemes; and other factors in 
important to outcomes.  More info: Whitten et al. (in 




Consider risk of future removal of vegetation – if 
high use covenants where possible to secure 
ongoing service provision. 
Cost to landholders to 
participate. 
Bid payments could be considered if costs likely to 
be high; experience suggests payments 
unnecessary. 
Treatment of multiple 
and group tenders 
•  Accept group tenders and treat as an individual 
tender.   
•  Multiple tenders from individuals be accepted but 
prohibit overlaps across tenders to reduce 
assessment complications. 
 